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Abstract
During the 2010s, both Finland and Sweden made advancements in their parental leave systems by widening the right to
paid parental leave to a greater diversity of family constellations and investing in gender-equal leave distribution through
longer leave periods reserved for the father. However, in the latter respect, Sweden has remained more successful than
Finland. This article analyses government and political party discourses in Finland and Sweden during the 2010s in pursuit
of an explanation to this difference and for understanding how ideas on social inclusion and gender equality have been
used to drive, or block, policy reforms in the field of parental leave. The results show that the parental leave discourses
have become influenced by ideas on social inclusion and gender equality in both countries, but in somewhat different
ways. While gender equality has retained a stronger position in the Swedish discourse and its policy, social inclusion, and
notably the rights of same-sex parents, have becomemore visible in the Finnish. However, the results also show that both
ideas have remained contested on a party level, especially by confessional and nationalist-populist parties.
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1. Introduction
From an international perspective, Finland and Sweden
appear similar when it comes to parental leave policy.
Both are Nordic dual earner/dual carer models with
socially including and gender-equal parental leave sys-
tems that not only acknowledge leave rights for a diver-
sity of families, but also seek to share leave more
equally betweenmothers and fathers (Haataja & Nyberg,
2006). Parental benefits are income-related with rela-
tively high replacement rates and a minimum flat-rate
allowance for parents without prior incomes. In both
countries, parental leaves are financed through contri-
butions mainly from the employer (Försäkringskassan,
2020a; Lammi-Taskula & Takala, 2009).
During the 2010s, both Finland and Sweden have con-
ducted reforms that aimed towards higher social inclu-
sion in their parental leave systems, for example, by
strengthening the rights of single parents and same-sex
parents (Wong, Jou, Raub, & Heymann, 2019). However,
while Sweden has also simultaneously strengthened its
already more gender-equal system, Finland has been
less successful in this respect. The Swedish leave sys-
tem is not only more generous and flexible than the
Finnish, but it also grants parents longer periods of
leave reserved for each parent. This, in turn, is linked
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to a higher leave uptake rate of Swedish fathers (Eydal
et al., 2015; Eydal, Rostgaard, & Hiilamo, 2018). For
instance, in 2016, Swedish fathers used 28.2% of all
leave, but Finnish fathers used only 10.5% (NOSOSCO,
2017, p. 56). Correspondingly, in 2015, the employ-
ment rate of Swedish mothers with children under three
surpassed that of Finnish mothers (Statistics Finland,
2017). Previous research has explained this divergence
in gender-equal leave policy by pointing at the more
prominent role that trade unions and employers play
in the Finnish policymaking process (Lammi-Taskula &
Takala, 2009). It has also suggested that the principle
of gender equality is stronger in Sweden while tradi-
tional family values and notions of freedom of choice
remain more salient in Finland (Hiilamo & Kangas, 2009;
Ylikännö, Hakovirta, & Salin, 2016). However, given the
centrality of political parties in family policymaking (e.g.,
Cedstrand, 2011; Häusermann, Picot, & Geering, 2013;
Nyby, 2020), there is surprisingly scant research on their
role in recent developments of Finnish and Swedish
parental leave policy.
This article contributes to the literature by analysing
how governments and leading parties in both countries
have politicised parental leave rights during the 2010s
against the backdrop of ideas on social inclusion and gen-
der equality. Both these ideas pertain to the fundamen-
tal question of who is to be considered a parent and who
can claim parental leave. However, we define social inclu-
sion as the idea of how this right is to be distributed
between different family constellations (cf. Wong et al.,
2019), while gender equality concerns how it is to be
distributed between women and men within families
(Auth & Martinek, 2017; Eydal et al., 2018; see also sec-
tion three). Based on this, our aim is to analyse gov-
ernment and party programmes from both countries
to discern how these ideas have been understood and
used in discourses legitimating, or contesting, parental
leave reforms. If there is discursive convergence, this
may not only suggest a transfer of ideas and social learn-
ing (Hulme, 2005), but also indicate that policy conver-
gence is likely to follow.
The article contributes to the literature in at least
two ways. First, it sheds light upon the role of political
parties, discourses and ideas for parental leave policy.
Second, it helps to assess whether political discourses on
parental leave have remained distinct or become more
similar in Finland and Sweden during this period. Such
knowledge will contribute to understanding policy trans-
fers between neighbouring countries.
The rest of the article is structured in the follow-
ing way. Next, we shortly present the development of
the Finnish and Swedish parental leave systems to con-
textualise our analysis. The following theoretical sec-
tion discusses the role of political parties and ideas in
parental leave policy. Thereafter, our data and meth-
ods are presented. The penultimate section presents our
findings, and the final section concludes and discussed
the findings.
2. The Finnish and Swedish Parental Leave Systems:
Historical Milestones and Current Outlooks
In both Finland and Sweden, the origins of parental leave
can be traced to the early 1900s and the ambition to pro-
tectworkingmothers in relation to childbirth (Wennemo,
1994). Over time, both systems have developed into
highly generous systems that acknowledge both a diver-
sity of families and gendered rights to parental leave
(Dobrotić & Blum, 2020; Eydal et al., 2018).
In Finland, the issue of maternity insurance was dis-
cussed already in the 1920s, but the introduction of
such a social right was delayed until 1963 when moth-
ers became eligible for a nine-week maternity allowance
as a part of the National Health Insurance. Since then,
the leave rights have been extended several times and
become more socially including as well as more gender-
equal. From the beginning, the parental leave system
catered for a diversity of families, bothworking-class and
rural families. During the following decades, also other
family types, such as adoptive parents, were included
in the system. A major step towards higher social inclu-
sion was taken in 2014, when a government commit-
tee (STM, 2015) suggested leave rights also for ‘new’
types of families, such as same-sex parents (so-called
rainbow families). In 2017, these families received leave
rights, and in 2019 leave rights for single parents and
transgender persons were expanded (see Moring &
Lammi-Taskula, 2021).
Alongside parental leave, also universal public child-
care saw daylight in Finland in 1973. The right to claim
public childcarewas expanded to all children under three
in 1990 and to all children under school age in 1996.
In order to relieve the pressure on public childcare ser-
vices and support the home care of small children, a child
home-care allowance (Kotihoidon tuki) was introduced
in 1985 (Hiilamo, 2002). This benefit, which is mostly
used directly after the parental leave period, has become
quite popular, especially amongmothers with lower edu-
cation and more insecure labour market position (e.g.,
Salmi & Lammi-Taskula, 2014)
Since 1978, Finnish fathers have also been able to
claim paid parental leave, first through a two-week paid
paternity leave (dependent upon the mother’s permis-
sion) and since 1991 through a ‘daddy quota’ that could
not be transferred to the mother without being for-
feited. They have also for some time had the right to
use the shareable period of parental leave, even if few
fathers have used this option. The one-week quota was
extended to three weeks in 1993, but at the expense
of the total length of parental leave. In 2003, fathers
received a two-week non-transferable leave bonus if
they used two weeks of the transferable parental leave
period. This combined leave became the ‘father’smonth’
in 2007, but while it was more flexible than before, it
was still tied to the usage of the transferable parental
leave (Lammi-Taskula & Takala, 2009). In 2010, the leave
bonus was extended to four weeks, which meant that
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the father could be on leave for six weeks in total if
he used two weeks of the transferable parental leave
(Salmi & Lammi-Taskula, 2014). In 2011, the parental
leave committee (STM, 2011) suggested an even more
ambitious reform for increasing gender equality, and
one alternative in this proposal was to introduce three-
month non-transferable ‘quotas’ for both the mother
and the father with a further three-month period that
could be shared. However, this proposal failed to materi-
alise and instead a nine-week quota called paternal leave
was introduced in 2013, including a three-week part that
could be used simultaneously with the mother (Salmi &
Lammi-Taskula, 2014).
Since 2013, there have been no further changes
in the gender structure of parental leave in Finland.
In 2017, the centre-right government tried to reform
the parental leave system in a more gender-equal way,
but failed. However, in 2019, the left-centre coalition
led by the Social Democrats once again placed the
question of a more gender-equal parental leave on the
agenda by suggesting longer quotas for both the father
and the mother. The government’s proposal including a
6.4-month reserved quota for each parent with a trans-
ferable period of 0–63 days was presented in February
2021 and is scheduled to take effect in August 2022
(STM, 2021).
Meanwhile, the existing system in Finland includes
17.5-week maternity leave, a nine-week paternity leave
and a 26.3-week transferable parental leave, on top of
which care leave and a home-care allowance can be
used for children under three. The replacement rate of
parental allowance is 70% and the basic amount approx.
29€/day for persons with yearly incomes under 11 943€
(Kela, 2020).
In Sweden, the protection of working women deliv-
ering a child has also been discussed since the begin-
ning of the 1900s (Lundqvist, 2007). Maternity leave was
introduced in the 1930s, but in the beginning mainly as
a means-tested benefit. A major shift in debate and pol-
icy took place in the 1960s when the voices for gender
equality throughwomen’s economic independencewere
combined with the increasing demand for female labour
in the growing public sector (Stanfors, 2007). In 1974,
as a consequence of the wide cross-party support for
the dual-earner family, maternity leave was replaced
by parental leave. A six-month-long parental leave now
became available for parents to share as they wished,
with allowances replacing 90% of their incomes.
When registered partnership for same-sex couples
became recognised in Sweden in 1995, one consequence
was that both partners in such unions received leave
rights. In 2003, same-sex parenthood was recognised,
which affected female partners of biological mothers
(Evertsson, Jaspers, & Moberg, 2020). However, only in
2019 did it become possible for one parent to trans-
fer his or her parental leave days to a partner (who is
not the biological parent). This change facilitated the
sharing of care among a greater number of adults and
also aimed to facilitate situations of a pending adop-
tion (for example, when one partner was inseminated)
(Försäkringskassan, 2020b).
As Swedish mothers’ labour force participation
increased during the 1970s, the focus of the parental
leave debate turned to fathers’ participation in child-
care. A major change came with the introduction of the
fathers’ quota in 1995. This reform reserved one month
of the 15-month long leave period for the other parent,
which was the father in most cases. The reform led to a
sharp increase in the share of fathers with children under
two taking up leave. Overnight, this share increased from
44% to 77% (Duvander & Johansson, 2012). The reserved
month was introduced together with a child home-care
allowance (Vårdnadsbidrag) by the conservative-liberal
government, but the home-care leave was later abol-
ished by the Social-Democratic government (Ferrarini
& Duvander, 2010). The reserved month was further
extended to two months in 2002, together with a
one-month extension of the parental leave. In 2008, the
conservative-liberal coalition introduced the so-called
gender equality bonus (Jämställdhetsbonus), a tax incen-
tive for increasing fathers’ childcare participation. It also
reinstalled the child home-care allowance on the munic-
ipal level. However, the gender equality bonus did not
lead to major changes in fathers’ uptake, and the child
home-care allowance never gained popularity (Duvander
& Ellingsæter, 2016; Duvander & Johansson, 2012).
In 2016, the Social-Democratic coalition abolished both
the gender equality bonus and the child home-care
allowance, but reserved the third month for each parent
without much resistance or even attention. Since then,
a further extension of leave rights suggesting a division
of the total leave period into three parts, one to each
parent and one to share according to wishes, has been
discussed (SOU, 2017, p. 101) but has thus far not led to
any reform.
During the 1900s, the demand for female labour
and the rise of gender-equal ideas in Sweden led to
voices demanding public childcare expansion. This expan-
sion gained speed in the end of the 1970s resulting in
an extension of publically financed childcare provision
(Gustafsson & Stafford, 1992). However, not until the
childcare guarantee and standardized fees were institu-
tionalised at the end of the 1990s, could one speak of
universal childcare (Nyberg, 2000).
Since 2002, the parental leave in Sweden is 16
months, or 8 months per each parent. The benefit is set
at almost 80% of earlier income for the first 13 months,
while the remaining months are replaced at a low flat
rate. Parents with no prior income are entitled to a low
flat-rate (today 25€ a day) benefit for the first 13 months
(Försäkringskassan, 2020a).
3. Parties, Ideas and the Politics of Parental Leave
There are various theoretical explanations for the devel-
opment of family policy, including parental leave (e.g.,
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Wennemo, 1994). Some of these use a functional logic
explaining family policy change as an outcome of struc-
tural factors and changing social needs. Another group of
explanations focusses on the political struggle between
ideologies and interests advocated by classes, political
parties or other actors. A third group emanates from
institutional theory emphasising, for example, lock-in
effects and path dependency as well as policy diffusion
and influential ideas (e.g., Kuebler, 2007). This article
departs from the second and third of these strands sug-
gesting that political parties play a vital role in parental
leave policy development, but that these processes are
influenced by institutional factors as well as ideas and
policy recommendations emanating from supranational
agencies, such as the European Union or the OECD.
Political parties fulfil several important functions. For
instance, they formulate ideologies and programmes
that provide voters with political alternatives necessary
for democracy. Second, they seek enough electoral sup-
port for obtaining the parliamentary power needed for
influencing legislation. In this process, they need strate-
gies, but also compromises. This is especially true for
countries with proportional voting systems and unicam-
eral parliaments, where coalition governments are the
rule (Häusermann et al., 2013; Lewin, 2020). For this arti-
cle, the first of the abovementioned functions is central
since it relates to how parties understand, construct and
formulate propositions for policy and how they invoke
influential ideas in this process (Nyby, 2020). Party pro-
grammes or election manifestos play an important role
in this respect since they create identity, define core val-
ues, and provide cognitive frames for understanding and
positioning themselves in relation to what is going on in
the world (Freeden, 1996).
However, party ideologies do not exist in a vacuum;
they evolve in tandem with the changing world. One
such change is the emergence of ‘new’ family constel-
lations and ‘new’ social needs (Nygård, Nyby, & Kuisma,
2019). Another is the globalisation process that has high-
lighted the role of supranational actors and influential
ideas in politics, as well as in parental leave policy. Today,
national governments and political parties operate in
a more open world with higher uncertainty, which has
made them more susceptible to supranational ideas,
social learning and policy benchmarking as ways of deal-
ing with uncertainty (Hulme, 2005).
An example of such an idea within parental leave pol-
icy is that of social inclusion, that is, the idea that parental
leave policy needs to acknowledge a greater diversity of
family constellations (Wong et al., 2019). Historically, this
idea is closely related to the notion of social and citizen
rights and the question of whether parental leave should
be based on citizenship or employment history (Dobrotić
& Blum, 2020). However, in today’s globalised world,
the meaning of ‘inclusiveness’ has become increasingly
influenced by the greater variety of family constella-
tions in need of social rights, such as same-sex parents,
transgender parents or immigrant parents (cf. European
Commission, 2019; Wong et al., 2019). Consequently,
the debate about social inclusion does not only con-
cern whether the leave rights of parents in traditional,
different-sex families should be based on citizenship
or previous employment, but also whether such rights
should pertain to other constellations of families, such as
same-sex parents (see Moring & Lammi-Taskula, 2021).
During the 2000s, this interpretation of social inclusion
has become notably influential in relation to same-sex
or transgender couples through international treaties,
such as the 2007 Yogyakarta Principles outlining central
human rights for LGBT persons or policy recommenda-
tions from the OECD supporting parenting regardless of
partnership status (Wong et al., 2019). For the purpose of
this article, though,we do not restrict the notion of social
inclusion to same-sex or LGBT couples alone. Instead,
it relates to how parental leave policy addresses fam-
ily diversity in general, that is, how leave rights are to
be distributed between different kinds of families and
especially how leave policy addresses the rights of a
greater diversity of family constellations, such as single-
parent families, immigrant families, as well as same-sex
and LGBT couples. Other kinds of social inclusion, such
as rights for parents in atypical employment or without
employment, have not been the focus of the politics in
Sweden and Finland during this period, probably as both
mothers’ and fathers’ work are taken for granted.
Another influential idea underpinning parental leave
policy is that of gender equality. According to Auth and
Martinek (2017), gender equality can be understood in
many ways involving several and interrelated policy aims
and instruments. However, one of its most central aims
is to increase women’s integration in the labour mar-
ket while simultaneously increasing men’s engagement
in care work, for example, through regulations on shared
leave, the combination of part-time work and care work,
as well as reserved leave periods for fathers. Historically,
the idea of gender equality stems from the women’s
movement and its struggle to improve the rights and
living conditions of women (Eydal et al., 2018; Hiilamo,
2002). However, in the 1990s, it also became an inte-
gral part of the influential social investment paradigm,
which not only advocated gender equality as a matter
of right, but also set this in connection with the objec-
tive to raise parental, and notably maternal, employ-
ment across Europe and to increase fathers’ involve-
ment in care work (e.g., Auth & Martinek, 2017; Morel,
Palier, & Palme, 2012). For the purpose of this article, we
use this as our starting point and define gender equal-
ity narrowly as an ambition to distribute parental leave
equally within the family, that is, between the mother
and the father.
Political parties, as well as social partners and
women’s organisations, have played a central role in
the shaping of the parental leave systems in Finland
and Sweden. When it comes to parties, they have done
so according to their ideological beliefs (e.g., Hiilamo,
2002), but also under the influence of dominant ideas,
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such as social inclusion and gender equality. Although
these ideas may come in many forms, and the ways
they become adopted by parties may differ between
countries, they play an important role in how parties
understand policy problems, how they create solutions
and what policy claims they make (Häusermann et al.,
2013; Nyby, 2020). During the first decades of the
post-war period, the Finnish and Swedish discussions
regarding social inclusion mainly concerned whether
parental leave should be employment-based or univer-
sal, residence-based, social rights (cf. Dobrotić & Blum,
2020). Whereas the former notion has been close to
social democracy, residence-based rights have been
close to parties representing farmers or conservatives.
In both countries, these principles became combined
in the post-war parental leave systems, with the for-
mer covering salaried parents and the latter providing
minimum income protection for other parents (Hiilamo,
2002). In the 1990s and 2000s, however, the question of
how to address diversity among families in Finnish and
Swedish parental leave became increasingly highlighted
by notably leftist and green parties. By contrast, con-
servatives and especially confessional parties remained
reserved to such ambitions (Hiilamo & Kangas, 2009).
Since the 1960s, the idea of gender equality has
also become increasingly important in both Finland and
Sweden. This idea became endorsed by the Swedish
Social Democrats already in the 1960 and later spread to
other parties (Cedstrand, 2011). It became a central polit-
ical objective in Swedish politics and has also influenced
parental leave policy in many ways, not least through
the introduction of the gender-neutral reserved monts
of parental leave, also known as daddy (and mommy)
months (Ferrarini & Duvander, 2010). However, the use
of state-sanctioned regulations to achieve more equal
leave uptake has remained a controversial issue for some
parties, notably confessional parties that saw such state-
sanctioned regulations as infringements upon the free-
dom of families (Hiilamo & Kangas, 2009). This has also
been the case in Finland, where the discussion regarding
gender-equal parental leave surfaced in the 1970s and
then started to grow in importance. However, due to the
scepticism towards state-sanctioned regulation of leave
between the mother and the father among the Centre
Party, the Finns Party and the Christian Democrats,
Finland has not thus far granted fathers the same
rights to reserved leave as in Sweden (Lammi-Taskula &
Takala, 2009).
In the 2000s, most of the leading parties in Finland
and Sweden have endorsed the idea of gender equality
as a general objective in parental leave policy, but there
is still an ideological divide concerning how parental
leave should be divided between the mother and the
father, and whether this should be sanctioned by the
state. While the political left has largely advocated equal
sharing of parental leave with a high degree of state
sanctioning, conservative and confessional parties have
generally opposed such ideas (Hiilamo & Kangas, 2009).
This divide is also visible in the discussion about the
child home-care allowance, which is a contested part
of the Finnish family leave system. In general, though,
Swedish parties seem to have been more positively dis-
posed to the idea of gender-equal parental leave than
their Finnish counterparts. This may be a result of longer
periods of Social-Democratic rule (Cedstrand, 2011), but
it may also relate to country differences in public opin-
ion, for instance, when it comes to mothers’ attitudes
towards family roles (Weckström, 2014) or the idea of
equal division of paid and unpaid work between spouses
(Ylikännö et al., 2016).
To sum up, parties play an important role in the poli-
tics of parental leave. They participate in the policymak-
ing process and do so according to different ideologies
and ideas, such as social inclusion and gender equal-
ity. Based on this, we expect to find a growing influ-
ence of social inclusion and gender equality ideas on
government and party discourses on parental leave in
Finland and Sweden during the 2010s. Secondly, how-
ever, we expect these ideas to be aligned along ideologi-
cal lines, with the political left advocating higher levels of
social inclusion and state-regulated gender equality and
conservative/confessional parties being more hesitant
towards such ideas. In the next section, we describe how
we investigated these hypotheses methodologically.
4. Data and Method
We conducted qualitative content analyses of govern-
ment programmes and government declarations, party
election programmes, as well as various reports from
committees preparing reforms in this area. Documentary
data of this kind provides rich and ample information
concerning how preferences, interests and ideological
values penetrate discourses influencing policy changes
(Nygård et al., 2019). Government programmes (Finland)
list the policies to be conducted during the govern-
ment term as well as the motivations behind them.
Since such programmes are not available in Sweden,
we used government declarations given by the Prime
Minister (PM) at the opening of the Swedish parliament.
It should be noted, though, that government documents
mostly reflect compromises between the governing par-
ties and do not constitute the view of a single party.
Therefore, we also analysed election programmes and
programmes on family policy published by the seven
largest parties in each country. For Finland, this group
included the Social Democratic Party, the Conservatives,
the Centre Party, the Finns Party, the Left Alliance, the
Green Party and the Christian Democrats. For Sweden,
it included the Social Democrats, the Conservatives, the
Centre Party, the Sweden Democrats, the Left Party , the
Christian Democrats and the Liberals. By studying such
programmes, we can identify and follow discourses on
parental leave on both a governmental and a party level
and study how they have related to questions on social
inclusion and gender equality.
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In total, we analysed seven government programmes
and 33 election manifestos and family policy pro-
grammes from Finland, as well as 11 government dec-
larations and 21 election programmes from Sweden
(see Supplementary File). Moreover, a number of com-
mittee reports and government bills were analysed for
the sake of depth and context. In Finland, the political
constellation during the 2010s has been characterised
by broad coalitions, including the centre-right coali-
tion of Kiviniemi (2010–2011), the right-left coalitions
of Katainen and Stubb (2011–2014 and 2014–2015),
the centre-right coalition of Sipilä (2015–2019), and
the left-centre coalition of Rinne/Marin (from 2019). In
Sweden, the political landscape has been more visibly
characterised by ‘bloc politics,’ minority coalitions led by
the Social Democrats and the strength of the populist
Sweden Democrats (Lewin, 2020). We studied the right-
centre “Alliance” coalition of Reinfeldt (2010–2014), the
Löfven I coalition between the Social Democrats and the
Greens (2014–2018) and the Löfven II coalition also led
by the Social Democrats. Noteworthy is also that the
studied period has been influenced by the economic
recession (more so in Finland than in Sweden), an asy-
lum crisis in 2015–2016 and a continuous fall in fertil-
ity in both countries. Due to limited space, our focus is
restricted to the period prior to the Covid-19 pandemic.
The analytical two-step approach involved qualita-
tive content analysis with a mix of ‘inductive’ and ‘deduc-
tive’ elements (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). First, we con-
ducted general readings of the programmes to get a
sense of the whole and locate text relating to parental
leave. Second, we identified direct or indirect mentions
of parental leave, which we then coded according to
whether they expressed a positive, negative or neutral
position regarding ideas on social inclusion and gender
equality. For instance, a mention supporting extended
parental leave rights for a certain type of family, e.g.,
same-sex parents, was coded positively for social inclu-
sion. Similarly, a mention supporting the introduction
of reserved periods of parental leave was coded posi-
tively for gender equality. This analytical approach can
be seen as a straightforward, but effective, procedure
for analysing discursive patterns underpinning parental
leave reform. Although we focus on discourses, we did
not use discourse analysis since our interest relatedmore
to the categorisation of meaning rather than the rev-
elation of underlying power constellations (Boréus &
Bergström, 2017). A limitation is that this strategy says
little about the actual policymaking process or the roles
of other actors. In the following, we present our results
using text excerpts (translated from Finnish and Swedish
by the authors) to substantiate our interpretations.
5. Findings
5.1. Finland
In Finland, ideas on both social inclusion and gender
equality were discussed in relation to parental leave pol-
icy during the 2010s (see Table 1).
However, the idea of social inclusion was addressed
only sparsely in government programmes, with the 2013
structural-political programme by PM Katainen advocat-
ing the rights of adoptive parents and the 2019 govern-
ment programme by PMMarin acknowledging the rights
of ‘diverse’ families:
Table 1. Overview of government and party discourses regarding parental leave in Finland during the 2010s.
2011–2014 2015–2018 2019–
Social inclusion
Government discourse GP (Katainen) 2013 + STM 2015:45 + GP (Rinne/Marin) 2019 (+)
STM 2011: 12 +
Party discourse SocDem/Left/Green + Left/Cen (+) SocDem/Left/Con +
Cen (+) Green (+)
Gender equality
Government discourse GP (Kiviniemi) 2010 (+) STM 2015:45 (+) GP (Rinne/Marin) 2019 +
GP (Katainen) 2011 +
STM 2011:12 +
Party discourse SocDem/Left/Green/Con + SocDem/Left/Green + SocDem/Left/Green/
Cen (+)/− Cen/Finns (+)/− Con +
Finns/ChD− Con (+) Cen/ChD−
ChD−
Notes: ‘Government discourse’ relates to government programmes (GP) or committee reports (STM). ‘Party discourse’ relates to party
election manifestos or similar programmes. ‘+’ denotes a positive position and ‘−’ a negative position on social inclusion/gender equal-
ity. ‘SocDem’ is an abbreviation for Social Democrats., ‘Left’ for Left Alliance, ‘Cen’ for Centre Party, ‘Con’ for Conservatives, ‘Finns’ for
Finns Party, ‘Green’ for Green League and ‘ChD’ for Christian Democrats. Parentheses indicate an indirect position. The data can be
retrieved from the Supplementary File.
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The [parental leave] reform will be conducted in
a way that treats all families equally, including
those representing diversity. (Finnish Government,
2019, p. 135)
Meanwhile, the question of equal parental leave rights
for adoptive, single and same-sex families was dis-
cussed more extensively in the 2011 and the 2015 com-
mittee reports, which ultimately led to the 2017 and
2019 reforms improving leave rights for ‘rainbow’ par-
ents, as well as single parents and transgender parents.
On the party level, social inclusion, including rights for
same-sex couples, was discussed most extensively by
the Social Democrat and the Greens, but also the Left
Alliance, while the Centre Party and the Conservatives
mentioned the right of single mothers and the includ-
ing of close relatives in the child home-care system.
No claims relating to social inclusion were found in the
programmes by the nationalist-populist Finns Party or
the Christian Democrats.
As to the idea of gender equality, the ambitions to
achieve higher gender equality in the form of higher
levels of father’s leave uptake was clearly stated in the
2011 committee report. Furthermore, both the Kiviniemi
and the Katainen governments explicitly advocated this
objective. However, while the former government, led by
the Centre Party, did not say how this was supposed to
be achieved, the latter was more specific by pinpointing
the use of earmarked leave:
The intention is to increase the earmarked leave for
fathers, and to make fathers’ use of leave more flexi-
ble. (Finnish Government, 2011, p. 70)
Katainen’s government, which also included the Social
Democrats, thus championed higher paternal leave
uptake and partly followed the recommendations given
by the 2011 committee report by introducing a nine-
week quota for fathers in 2013. It also criticised the child
home-care leave for being detrimental to the govern-
ment’s objective to increase gender equality and mater-
nal employment. However, it refrained from a reform of
this benefit and instead chose to introduce a flexible care
allowance for families with a child under three years of
age. Subsequent governments in Finland have thus far
refrained from reforming the child home-care allowance.
In 2017, the question of a more gender-equal parental
leave system resurfaced when the Sipilä centre-right gov-
ernment unexpectedly launched a reform of the system.
This initiative was supported by the opposition as well
as the major trade unions and the employers’ central
organisation, but was not mentioned in the 2015 gov-
ernment programme (Elomäki, Mustosmäki, & Koskinen
Sandberg, 2020). That the Centre Party halted the reform
in 2018 was probably strategically motivated. In the face
of the incoming 2019 parliamentary election, it wanted
to show its voters that it stood its ground on the preser-
vation of the child home-care allowance. However, in the
programme of Marin’s current left-centre coalition, the
need to reform parental leave in a gender-equal direc-
tion through equal leave quotas for the mother and the
father was put back on the table, however with the child
home-care allowance untouched:
Together with social partners, we will achieve an
ambitious parental leave reform that supports the
wellbeing of families. The objective is for leave
and care duties to become more evenly distributed
between parents….The reform will give mothers and
fathers an equal quota of leave months….The child
home-care allowance continues in its current form.
(Finnish Government, 2019, p. 135)
On the party level, gender-equal parental leave, and
notably the question of the child home-care leave, has
created a division between the Centre Party, the Finns
Party and the Christian Democrats on one side, and the
Leftist parties and the Conservatives on the other. While
the former camp has supported the home-care leave,
the latter has suggested a shortening or even removal of
this benefit. As to the question of state-regulated gen-
der equality through quotas, the Christian Democrats
has been the only party explicitly opposing such an idea.
The Centre Party and the Finns Party have taken a luke-
warm position, while the Conservatives, as well as the
parties on the left and the Greens, have all supported
this idea. Already in 2010–2011, the Left Alliance and
the Greens suggested a six-month-long quota for both
the mother and the father with a six-month shareable
period, extending the total leave period to 18 months.
In 2014, the Social Democrats proposed a similar model,
but with shorter parental quotas (three months) and a
nine-month shareable leave period. In 2019, they sug-
gested a shortening of the shareable leave to six months
while simultaneously proposing a one-year leave period
with a flat-rate parental allowance (that would substitute
the home-care allowance). The Greens and the Social
Democrats both referred to the Swedish system of indi-
vidualised leave right as a best practice, but so did also
the Christian Democrats in terms of flexible leave rights.
The Conservatives suggested a similar parental leave
reform as the Social Democrats, but with a shorter dura-
tion. The Finns Party suggested a three-month quota for
each parent with a nine-month shareable period, while
the Centre Party suggested an extension of the current
daddy quota. By contrast, in the 2018 family policy pro-
gramme by the Christian Democrats, leave quotas were
seen as an infringement upon the family:
The Christian Democrats do not support leave quo-
tas between parents, since this would infringe upon
the freedom of choice and lead to unnecessary regu-
lation. (Christian Democrats, 2018a, p. 20)
To sum up, while the Finnish discourse on parental leave
has clearly been influenced by both ideas on social
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inclusion and gender equality, it seems that the lat-
ter idea has received more attention than the former,
even if no reforms increasing gender equality have been
conducted since 2013, while policy advancements have
been made regarding social inclusion. Moreover, both
ideas seem to have divided parties, with the leftist par-
ties openly supporting social inclusion while conserva-
tive and confessional parties have been more reserved,
especially when it comes to the rights of ‘rainbow’ fami-
lies. Somewhat surprisingly, the idea of state-regulated
gender equality through leave quotas seems to have
received increasing support over time, even among the
Finns Party and the Centre Party. However, it should
be noted that the Centre Party has been more ambiva-
lent than the Finns Party in this respect and that both
parties, together with the Christian Democrats, have
connected this issue to the preservation of the child
home-care leave.
5.2. Sweden
In Sweden, the government and party discourses on
parental leave during the 2010s also related to both
social inclusion and gender equality. While the latter has
been in a dominant position, the former has gainedmore
attention over time (see Table 2).
At the beginning of the 2010s, the idea of social inclu-
sion was discussed mainly by the conservative-liberal
coalition in relation to improved leave rights for single
moms and student families:
For those [parents] that are single, the possibility to
use all parental leave days needs to be introduced.
(The Alliance, 2010, p. 33)
In the same vein, the Liberals advocated stronger rights
to leave for unemployed and sick parents, while the
Centre Party supported self-employed parents’ rights
to leave. However, the conservative-liberal government
also framed the idea of social inclusion in a negative way.
In 2010, it envisaged stricter entitlement rules for immi-
grants for the sake of more effective integration:
The parental allowance will be adjusted to improve
the chances of newly arrived foreign-born women to
get a job. (Swedish Government, 2010)
In 2016, the Social-Democratic government launched a
committee to prepare a restriction of eligibility rules
for immigrant families with older children (Swedish
Government, 2016a). In its preliminary report (SOU,
2016), the committee suggested a restriction in leave
days for immigrant parents arriving with foreign-born
children. The argument was that it would enhance the
integration of immigrants and prevent unfairness in
terms of ‘over-compensating’ benefits for immigrant par-
ents’ (SOU, 2016, pp. 10-12). In 2017, this restriction
was enacted as a part of the ‘migration’ deal struck
between the Social-Democratic coalition and the oppo-
sition. Accordingly, parents who immigrated when their
child was between 12 and 24 months received 200 days
Table 2. Overview of government and party discourses regarding parental leave in Sweden during the 2010s.
2010–2014 2014–2017 2018–
Social inclusion
Government discourse GD (Reinfeldt) 2010 +/− GD (Löfven) 2014 +
GD (Reinfeldt) 2012 + GD (Löfven) 2015 +
SOU 2016:73−
SOU 2017:101 +
Party discourse Left (+) SocDem/Left + SocDem +
Lib/Con + Cen + Lib +
Gender equality
Government discourse SOU 2011:51 + GD (Löfven) 2014: +, 0 GD (Löfven) 2019 +
GD (Löfven) 2015 + SOU 2017 +
SOU 2014:6 +
SOU 2015:50 +/−
Party discourse SocDem/Left/Lib/Cen + SocDem/Left/Lib/Cen + SocDem (+)
Con +/(−) Con + Left/Lib +
ChD/SwD− ChD/SwD− Con 0
ChD/SwD−
Notes: ‘Government discourse’ relates to government declarations (GD) or committee reports (SOU). ‘Party discourse’ relates to party
election manifestos or similar programmes. ‘+’ denotes a positive position and ‘−’ a negative position on social inclusion/gender equal-
ity, ‘0’ denotes other mentions regarding parental leave. ‘SocDem’ is an abbreviation for Social Democrats. ‘Left’ for Left Party, ‘Lib’ for
Liberal Party, ‘Cen’ for Centre Party, ‘Con’ for Conservatives, ‘ChD’ for Christian Democrats and ‘SwD’ for SwedenDemocrats. Parentheses
indicate an indirect position. The data can be retrieved from the Supplementary File.
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of parental allowance in total, and parents who immi-
grated when the child was over 24 months received
100 days in total (Swedish Government, 2017).
In themiddle of the 2010s, the idea of social inclusion
turnedmore towards same-sex and transgender families,
so-called ‘star’ or ‘rainbow’ families. The 2014 and 2015
government declarations, as well as the 2017 committee
report, suggested improved leave rights for these family
constellations:
The parental leave insurance will be overhauled in
order to make it easier for families that identify
themselves as star families. (Swedish Government,
2014, p. 9)
The Social Democrats and the Left Party supported this
idea in their election programmes, but did not connect it
explicitly to the question of equal rights to parental leave.
For instance, in their 2018 election programme, the
Social Democrats called for higher competence among
social care personnel and modernised legislation as a
way to ease the lives of “star families” (Social Democrats,
2018, p. 26). The Left Party, which acknowledged ‘star
families’ already in its 2010 election programme, took
this discourse a step further by including all families in
this category:
We want to see a feminist family policy based on
reality, that we are a country of star families where
families look different and are formed differently.
(The Left Party, 2014)
As to gender equality, both the Swedish government
and party discourses in the 2010s related mainly to
how to make an already gender-equal parental leave
system even more equal. In the conservative-liberal
government’s discourse, this was something that could
be achieved through the existing reserved months,
more flexibility, and the so-called gender-equality bonus
(The Alliance, 2010). However, when the Social
Democrats came back to power in 2014, the govern-
ment’s discourse changed. The gender equality bonus
and the child home-care allowance was now portrayed
as inefficient tools for changing the uneven division of
parental leave, which led to their termination a cou-
ple of years later (Swedish Government, 2015a, 2016b).
Instead, the government accentuated an expansion of
the state-regulated parental quotas as a more efficient
way to change parental behaviour in a more gender-
equal direction (SOU, 2014, 2015).
In 2015, the Löfven Government stated that it, as
the “first feminist” government, was about to bring the
Swedish parental leave policy back to the path of gen-
der equality:
The world’s first feminist government is now con-
ducting policies that increase gender equality
between men and women….A third month is to
be reserved for each parent. (Swedish Government,
2015b, p. 16)
Furthermore, in the 2017 committee report on gender-
equal parenthood (SOU, 2017), the idea of gender equal-
ity was combined with higher flexibility in an ambition to
introduce a “family week,” which would be an extension
of the current temporary leave for parents in order to
increase parents’ time together with their children (SOU,
2017; Swedish Government, 2020).
Even though the 2016 introduction of a third
reserved month was approved without much discussion,
the question of state-regulated leave quotas remained
contested by some parties. While the Social Democrats,
the Left Party and the Liberals explicitly supported quo-
tas and criticised the child home-care allowance, the
Christian Democrats and the nationalist-populist Sweden
Democrats vehemently opposed state-regulated quotas
and instead advocated more flexibility and freedom for
parents to choose how children should be cared for,
including the right to use child home-care allowance:
All families are unique and therefore parents them-
selves know best how they want to arrange the care
of their children….Remove the compulsory quotas
and make the parental insurance more flexible—The
days are to be freely transferable between parents or
other close persons. (Christian Democrats, 2018b)
Meanwhile, the Centre Party and the Conservatives took
something of amiddle position by supporting higher flex-
ibility and freedom of choice in matters of childcare,
but refraining from explicitly criticising state-regulated
leave quotas.
To sum up, while both the policy development and
political discourses in Sweden during the 2010s have
shifted back to amore traditional Social-Democratic path
based on state-regulated gender equality, there has also
been a development in the discourse on social inclusion.
This discourse has increasingly highlighted parental leave
rights for ‘new’ family formations and ‘star’ families, but
has also demanded restrictions of unintended benefits
for foreign-born children.
6. Discussion and Conclusions
The aim of this article was to investigate government and
party discourses on parental leave in Finland and Sweden
during the 2010s against the backdrop of ideas on social
inclusion and gender equality. Based on our findings, we
can draw the following conclusions.
First, while the focus of Finnish and Swedish govern-
ment and party discourses during the 2010s has been
more on gender equality than social inclusion, the lat-
ter idea received a more visible role over time, leading
up to major reforms in Finland regarding the rights of
single parents and ‘rainbow’ families. Also, in Sweden,
this aspect of social inclusion became more visible over
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time. As can be expected, the idea of gender equal-
ity has played a more visible role in the Swedish dis-
course than in the Finnish. Sweden has also made its
already gender-equal parental leavemore equal through
the introduction of the third reserved month in 2016,
while Finland has not (thus far) succeeded to conduct fur-
ther reforms in this field since the 2013 reform. While
the increasing role of social inclusion, notably the rights
of ‘rainbow’ and ‘star families,’ reflects contemporary
changes in the family institution and international agree-
ments (cf.Wong et al., 2019), it also relates to the increas-
ing importance of policy transfer and social learning
(Hulme, 2005). Not only have ideas and policy imper-
atives from the EU and the OECD influenced Finnish
and Swedish discourses, it is also clear that Sweden has
served as a role model for politicians and civil servants in
Finland, especially when it comes to the implementation
of gender equality in parental leave policy.
Second, in both countries, the ideas on social inclu-
sion and gender equality in parental leave policy have
been understood and implemented differently depend-
ing on the ideological stance of governments and par-
ties. Leftist governments and leftist parties in both coun-
tries have generally andmore explicitly advocated higher
social inclusion for a greater diversity of family constella-
tions. They have also advocated higher gender equality
in parental leave through state-regulated quotas, while
governments and parties on the right have instead advo-
cated higher flexibility and freedom of choice for parent
(cf. Hiilamo & Kangas, 2009). However, in Finland, par-
ties, except for the Christian Democrats, seem to have
become more positively disposed towards the idea of
gender-equal leave through longer and reservedmonths,
which suggests that this particular version of the idea
of gender equality is gaining acceptance across ideologi-
cal lines.
Third, it seems that the Finnish and Swedish dis-
courses on parental leave have becomemore similar dur-
ing the 2010s, especially when it comes to the role that
gender equality through individual parental quotas plays
in the overall debate. Even if Sweden has been more suc-
cessful in shaping its parental leave system in this direc-
tion, Finland has also locked in on this track. Also, the fact
that Finland tried to reform its system in 2017–2018 and
that the current government plans to introduce parental
quotas that are even longer than those in Sweden (STM,
2021) shows that Finland is determined to close in on
Sweden in this respect. The observed change in the
Finnish party discourse towards a more positive dispo-
sition regarding gender equality may be of importance
for the completion of a successful parental leave reform.
However, although Finnish parties have become more
positive towards leave quotas, they still differ in how to
implement them, and notably what the role of the con-
troversial child home-care leave should be. It is also note-
worthy that even if Finnish discourse on gender-equal
parental leave has become more similar to the Swedish,
it still seems to be somewhat more ‘traditional’ than the
Swedish, with fewermentions of gender equality or ‘fem-
inist’ policy.
Since this article used only documentary data, we
cannot say much about how ideas on social inclusion
or gender equality have penetrated the deeper layers
of governments or parties. For this, we need future
research that employs also other data. Furthermore, the
focus on governments and political parties is another lim-
itation that could be rectified by studying also social part-
ners and other major players. Nevertheless, this study
shows that ideas play an important role for political dis-
course, and that such discourses are important drivers
or blockers of reform. It seems not farfetched then that
the observed convergence in parental leave discourse in
Finland and Swedenmay bring along higher convergence
also in parental leave policy over time.
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